AbstrAct
URLLC is one category of service to be provided by next-generation wireless networks. Motivated by increasing security concerns in such networks, this article focuses on physical layer security in the context of URLLC. The physical layer security technique mainly uses transmission designs based on the intrinsic randomness of the wireless medium to achieve secrecy. As such, physical layer security is of a lower complexity and incurs less latency than traditional cryptography. In this article, we first introduce appropriate performance metrics for evaluating physical layer security in URLLC and investigate the trade-off between latency, reliability, and security. We then identify the key challenging problems for achieving physical layer security in URLLC, and discuss the role that channel state information can have in providing potential solutions to these problems. Finally, we present our recommendations on future research directions in this emerging area.
IntroductIon
Next-generation wireless networks (fifth generation and beyond) will be fundamentally different from previous generations in many regards. Perhaps most importantly and contrary to earlier generations of wireless networks, which focused on data rate as the single most important requirement, next-generation wireless networks will have ultra-reliable and low-latency communication (URLLC) as a requirement. URLLC is envisioned to enable the wireless exchange of data packets with ultra-high reliability (error probability on the order of 10 -7 ) and ultra-low latency (end-to-end delay on the order of 1 ms) [1] . Such communication embodies a new wireless paradigm in which "click-and-wait" communications are replaced by dependable real-time interactive communications. In this new paradigm, the assurance of ultra-high reliability creates confidence that wireless communications can be used even in life-threatening circumstances, while ultra-low latency ensures real-time functionality in time-critical interactive communications. The emergence of URLLC will enable many new time-critical applications such as autonomous networked vehicles, next-generation factory automation, tele-surgery, and the Tactile Internet [2] , thereby opening up lucrative new business opportunities for many industrial sec-tors. As such, a large amount of research effort has been dedicated to URLLC in recent years. Such research efforts continue to grow, aiming at finding technical solutions to the somewhat contradictory requirements of ultra-high reliability and ultra-low latency.
Although the key requirements of URLLC are mainly related to reliability and latency, security issues are also critical in most application scenarios of URLLC. For example, in addition to ultra-low latency and ultra-high reliability, other key requirements arising from the nature of the Tactile internet are security and privacy [1] . In addition, the leakage of critical and confidential information in some applications of URLLC may lead to attacks that are difficult to defend against. We present an example in Fig. 1 to further demonstrate this point, where T 1 is the time when we have the scenario on the left-half figure and T 2 is the time when we have the scenario shown on the right-half figure. In this figure, we show that if an eavesdropper obtains a legitimate vehicle's message together with its random sequence (used for authentication) through eavesdropping, the eavesdropper can successfully replace the legitimate message (i.e., "slow down" sent by the green car in Fig. 1 ) with some misleading information (i.e., "speed up" sent by the eavesdropper in Fig. 1 ) within vehicular networks. Such misleading information can potentially result in fatal accidents [3] .} The example shown in Fig. 1 demonstrates the importance of both information confidentiality and message integrity, since the leaked random sequence leads to the fake misleading information being accepted (message integrity is not guaranteed). A brief discussion of the importance of message integrity in the context of URLLC can be found in [4] , and in this work we focus on information confidentiality. We also note that information confidentiality is widely addressed by cryptography algorithms in traditional communications. However, in the context of URLLC, cryptography algorithms may violate the ultra-low latency requirement due to the high-complexity signal processing required by encryption and decryption [1] . Furthermore, the key distribution required by cryptograph solutions may cause extra delay in some application scenarios.
Different from traditional cryptography algorithms, physical layer security mainly utilizes transmission techniques, and the inherent properties of the wireless medium, to achieve secrecy [5] . In the wiretap channel model for physical layer security, a transmitter, Alice, sends confidential information to a legitimate receiver, Bob, while an eavesdropper, Eve, attempts to interpret this confidential information by eavesdropping on Alice's transmission. One advantage of physical layer security techniques is that they do not require key distribution or encryption/decryption. Thus, physical layer security can potentially defend against eavesdropping attacks without violating the ultra-low latency requirement in URLLC. Going forward, therefore, physical layer security may well be the main security technology invoked to protect URLLC in next-generation wireless networks.
Physical layer security has previously been widely studied in wireless communications, but largely without consideration of an ultra-low latency or ultra-high reliability constraint. As such, many fundamental questions about physical layer security in the context of URLLC remain unclear. For example, "What are the proper secrecy metrics used to evaluate physical layer security in URLLC scenarios?" is just one of these questions. Due to the finite (and small) blocklength considered in URLLC, the decoding error probabilities at both Bob and Eve are not negligible in wiretap channels. Another consequence of small blocklength is that many widely-used secrecy metrics cannot be used to evaluate the performance of physical layer security in URLLC scenarios. For example, the well known secrecy capacity and secrecy outage probability both require an infinite blocklength n. In addition, the information-theoretic strong secrecy and weak secrecy in the context of physical layer security are both defined in the limit of n → ∞, and therefore they also are not applicable to URLLC.
Channel state information (CSI) is required in many of the techniques used to enhance the reliability and security of wireless communications. However, due to the short blocklength required by the ultra-low latency in URLLC, there may not be a sufficient amount of channel uses needed for accurate channel estimation. Against this background, many problems related to CSI in physical layer security for URLLC are challenging and should be revisited. The initial challenge is to determine whether (and when) CSI is required for achieving physical layer security in URLLC scenarios, a question that is hard to directly clarify given the limited channel uses. We do note, however, that communication without the use of CSI may bring one benefit for physical layer security in URLLC, that is, it potentially limits Eve's channel estimation ability. This could force Eve to use non-coherent decoding techniques for eavesdropping on Alice's confidential information.
In this article we discuss all of the above issues in some detail, organized as follows. In the following section, we review the used secrecy performance metrics in the literature and clarify whether they are applicable to physical layer security in URLLC scenarios. Challenging problems related to CSI and potential solutions for achieving and enhancing physical layer security in URLLC are then presented. We conclude this article in the final section.
PerformAnce metrIcs for PhysIcAl lAyer securIty In urllc
In this section, we review the widely used secrecy performance metrics for physical layer security and clarify whether they can be adopted to evaluate physical layer security in URLLC scenarios.
InformAtIon-theoretIc secrecy PerformAnce metrIcs
Perfect secrecy was initially used as the secrecy coding metric by Shannon, which requires zero mutual information between M and X n , where M is the transmitted message and X n is a length-n codeword used to transmit M [6] . We note that "zero" mutual information means that the coded message X n does not provide any information on the message M. Perfect secrecy can also be taken to mean the mutual information between M and Z n is zero, where Z n is the received symbol at Eve. This means that Eve cannot obtain any information on the transmitted message M from her received symbol Z n . The definition of perfect secrecy is valid for arbitrary values of the codeword length n. As such, it is suitable for defining secrecy in physical layer security for URLLC. However, as Shannon proved, perfect secrecy can only be achieved when the entropy of the secret key is at least that of the entropy of the transmitted message itself, leading to the fact that the notion of perfect secrecy is impractical. Therefore, we can conclude that perfect secrecy is not a practical metric for evaluating physical layer security in URLLC.
Considering the impractical issues of perfect secrecy, weak secrecy and strong secrecy were proposed as alternative secrecy metrics for evaluating physical layer security. Weak secrecy is achieved if the per-channel use mutual information between M and Z n approaches zero as n approaches infinity, while strong secrecy is achieved if the total mutual information for all channel uses approaches zero as n becomes infinite [7] . Although weak and strong secrecies are achievable by practical coding strategies [6] , as per their definitions, it is hard to evaluate their uses in URLLC in the context of physical layer security. This is again due to the fact that their definitions require n being infinite, while in URLLC n must be finite and small due to the required ultra-low latency. In physical layer security, secrecy capacity is another widely used secrecy metric. In most existing works with secrecy capacity as the performance metric, it has not been clarified whether its definition is based on weak secrecy or strong secrecy. We would like to clarify that secrecy capacity is not a proper performance metric for physical layer security in URLLC, no matter whether it is defined based on weak secrecy or strong secrecy [7] . For example, the widely used secrecy capacity is defined as the supremum of the code rate (i.e., the information rate) that can achieve weak secrecy (against a passive Eve) as a function of wiretap channel parameters, while guaranteeing an arbitrarily low error probability at Bob [7] . As such, this secrecy capacity cannot be used as a metric for a finite small n in URLLC, due to the fact that weak secrecy requires n → ∞. Intuitively, this can be explained by the fact that the main channel capacity C b or the eavesdropper's channel capacity C e cannot be achieved with arbitrarily low error probabilities.
Due to the same reasoning as outlined above, another widely used secrecy metric, that is, secrecy outage probability, also cannot be used to evaluate physical layer security in URLLC scenarios. For a finite blocklength n, there exists a trade-off between the channel coding rate R and the corresponding error probability e [8] . As n → ∞, this channel coding rate approaches the channel capacity while e → 0. To further illustrate this point, in Fig. 2 we plot the error probability e (its expression is taken from [8] ) versus the channel coding rate R for different values of the blocklength n. In addition to the tradeoff between R and e, in this figure we observe that for a fixed R, e increases significantly as n decreases in the low regime of n. This demonstrates that the error probability e is not negligible in URLLC. For physical layer security in URLLC, this non-negligible error probability exists at both Bob and Eve. As such, a fair secrecy performance metric should consider the impact of R, e, and n on physical layer security in URLLC scenarios.
non-InformAtIon-theoretIc secrecy PerformAnce metrIcs
Considering specific coding schemes (e.g., low-density parity-check codes), the authors of [9] proposed to use the so called security gap as a measure of secrecy, a metric based on the average bit-error rate (BER). The security gap is defined as SNR B,min /SNR E,max , where SNR B,min denotes the reliability threshold and SNR E,max denotes the security threshold. The reliability threshold is defined as the lowest signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the main channel that ensures the reliability requirement that P B BER is not higher than P B BER,max . Here, P B BER is the average BER at Bob, and P B BER,max (≈ 0) denotes the maximum average BER required to guarantee the reliability of the communication from Alice to Bob. The security threshold is defined as the highest SNR of the eavesdropper's channel that ensures the security requirement that P E BER is higher than P E BER,min , where P E BER is the average BER at Eve and P E BER,min (≈ 0.5) denotes the minimum average BER that guarantees a certain level of secrecy (e.g., Eve cannot extract much information on Alice's transmitted message from her received signals). Considering that the average BER can be evaluated for arbitrary values of the blocklength n, the proposed security gap can be used to evaluate physical layer security in URLLC. Also based on the average BER, the rate interval was proposed as another secrecy metric to evaluate physical layer security with a finite blocklength n [10] . Mathematically, the rate interval is given by DR = R sup -R inf , where R sup is the highest allowable transmission rate to satisfy P B BER being less than or equal to P B BER,max and R inf is the lowest allowable transmission rate to satisfy P E BER being larger than or equal to P E BER,min . As clarified in [10] , the rate interval is not always positive. When DR is positive, Alice is able to transmit information reliably and securely to Bob. When DR is negative, it is not possible for Alice to set a transmission rate such that the above two constraints are satisfied simultaneously and thus Alice's reliable and secure information transmission should be suspended. We note that this rate interval converges to the secrecy capacity as n approaches infinity. This is due to the fact that, in the limit of n → ∞, the main channel capacity C b is achievable with an arbitrarily low average BER and Eve cannot obtain any information on Alice's transmission as long as the transmission rate is greater than C e . For a finite n, as clarified in [10] , R sup is visibly lower than C b , but R inf cannot be significantly lower than C e . As such, we may still have the rate interval being negative even when the secrecy capacity is positive. This demonstrates the tradeoff among communication latency, reliability, and security in the context of URLLC, and indicates that the rate interval can be used as a performance metric for physical layer security in URLLC.
Determining the expression of the average BER requires a specified coding scheme. However, general expressions for the average BER are hard to obtain for coded systems. This is one issue that works against the aforementioned security gap and rate interval metrics in the context of URLLC. In order to overcome this issue, the bit-error cumulative distribution function (BE-CDF) and bit-error rate cumulative distribution function (BER-CDF) were proposed as alternative metrics to replace the average BER for defining the security gap and rate interval [7] . The calculations of the BE-CDF and BER-CDF only require the error correction capability of a coding scheme (which is relatively easier than the calculation of the average BER), and thus lead to a tractable performance analysis on physical layer security with a finite n. In addition, as clarified in [7] , the BE-CDF and BER-CDF provide more information on the BER performance of a system and thus they can offer a stronger secrecy guarantee for URLLC. Following [7] , we present Table  1 to summarize our main points of the discussed various secrecy performance metrics. In physical layer security, another secrecy requirement given a finite blocklength n is the one based on the average probability of decoding error [11] . In general, this secrecy requirement can be represented by the reliability constraint that P e n (B) is not higher than b 1 , and the security constraint that P e n (E) is not lower than b 2 , where P e n (B) and P e n (E) denote the average probabilities of decoding error at Bob and Eve, respectively. Here, b 1 is the maximum allowable average probability of decoding error at Bob, and b 2 is a lower bound on the average probability of decoding error at Eve. As mentioned in [11] , the blocklength n should be sufficiently large in order to simultaneously guarantee the reliability constraint and the security constraint. As such, these two constraints may not be simultaneously satisfied for a finite small n (this is similar to the fact that the rate interval based BER metrics may not always be positive). This again explicitly shows the trade-off among latency, reliability, and security in wireless communications [12] .
In order to further demonstrate the trade-off among latency, reliability, and security in URLLC scenarios, we plot Fig. 3 based on the research work of [8] . To this end, we use the error probability given in [8] to replace the previously discussed average BER, BE-CDF, BER-CDF, and the average probability of decoding error. The calculation of the error probability in [8] does not require a particular coding scheme, the error correction capability of a coding scheme, or the modulation method, since this specific error probability approximates the error probability that can be achieved by any scheme. Accordingly, the secrecy requirement can be written as the reliability constraint (e B being not higher than b b ) and the security constraint (e E being not lower than b e ), where e B and e E are the error probabilities at Bob and Eve, respectively.
The error probability e B monotonically increases with the main channel coding rate R b for fixed n and fixed SNR at Bob, denoted by γ b [13] . This leads to the reliability constraint determining an upper bound R b e on R b , for fixed n and γ b . Likewise, the security constraint determines a lower bound R e e on the eavesdropper's channel coding rate R e for fixed n and fixed SNR at Eve denoted by γ e . We note that R b e and R e e correspond to R sup and R inf in the rate interval metric that is defined using BER metrics. In Fig. 3 , we plot R b e and R e e versus the blocklength n for different values of γ b and γ e . We note that the reliability and security constraints can only be simultaneously satisfied when R b e is not lower than R e e . We also note that the curves for R e e are horizontal in Fig. 4 . This is due to b e = 0.5, for which R e e is the same as the corresponding channel capacity, which is not a function of the blocklength n. In this figure, we also observe that R b e , being not lower than R e e , is more likely to be satisfied for a larger n in terms of requiring a smaller value of γ b / γ e (which is one type of security gap). This once again explicitly demonstrates the trade-off among latency, reliability, and security, and indicates that the security gap and rate interval based on error probability are valid performance metrics for physical layer security in URLLC scenarios. We note that the secrecy metrics discussed in this subsection are non-information-theoretic, which leads to the fact that the security measured by these metrics is not information-theoretically guaranteed. However, such security is acceptable in URLCC scenarios, since the ultra-low latency forces that the outdated confidential information is of no value [9] .
csI Issues on AchIevIng PhysIcAl lAyer securIty In urllc Current research on physical layer security for URLLC is in its preliminary stage and further exploration is required. As such, many challenging issues remain in the implementation of physical layer security in practical URLLC scenarios, including but not limited to: • Wiretap coding to simultaneously meet the latency, reliability, and security requirements • Designing efficient feedback strategies with optimal trade-offs between quantization accuracy and overhead cost • Achieving accurate CSI under the constraints of ultra-low latency, ultra-high reliability, and moderate levels of security. As we clarified previously, CSI plays a critical role in achieving physical layer security in URLLC, since CSI is required in many techniques used to enhance wireless communication reliability and security (e.g., beamforming and artificial-noise-aided secure transmission schemes). Therefore, in this section, we first clarify some design challenges related to CSI in achieving physical layer security in URLLC, and then point out some potential techniques to overcome these challenges. The challenges we raise are schematically shown in Fig. 4 .
coherent communIcAtIons vs non-coherent communIcAtIons
As mentioned previously, due to the required ultralow latency of URLLC, there may not be enough channel uses to perform channel estimation and feedback during one communication block. This leads to the necessity of conducting communications in URLLC where no CSI is estimated or fed back to a receiver before information transmission. We refer here to such communications as non-coherent communications. Actually, non-coherent communications bring one benefit for physical layer security, that is, non-coherent communications do not require any estimation or feedback of the CSI of the main channel, thus limiting Eve's opportunity to obtain the CSI of the eavesdropper's channel. This, in turn, reduces the eavesdropping capability of Eve by forcing her to use non-coherent communication techniques. Meanwhile, we note that the unknown CSI also decreases the performance of the communication from Alice to Bob, that is, non-coherent communication leads to low reliability of the transmission from Alice to Bob. As such, how to enhance the reliability of non-coherent communications should be tackled before applying this technique to URLLC scenarios that attempt to achieve physical layer security. Therefore, non-coherent communications have a double-sided impact (reducing latency but also decreasing reliability) on physical layer security in URLLC relative to coherent communications with full CSI. Accordingly, a significant future research direction for URLLC is to clarify the conditions under which non-coherent communications outperform coherent communications, and how much performance gain can be achieved by each in the context of physical layer security for URLLC.
chAnnel InversIon Power control bAsed on chAnnel recIProcIty
In some applications (e.g., emergency alert systems), only uplink or downlink communications require URLLC. In such applications, channel inversion power control (CIPC) based on channel reciprocity [14] can be used to overcome the CSI issues. We use the example where only the uplink from a user to a base station (BS) requires URLLC and security to demonstrate this point. Since the downlink communication does not require low latency, pilots can be periodically transmitted by the BS such that the user can estimate the downlink channel h d . When the uplink communication with URLLC requirement is on demand, the user can use CIPC based on channel reciprocity (i.e., the uplink channel h u is the same as h d ) to guarantee that the power of the received signals is a constant Q. We note that Q is a constant value, which leads to the outcome that the beamformer is h d † /|h d | and the transmit power P t varies as per |h u | 2 . In this CIPC, Eve cannot obtain any information on the eavesdropper's channel. In addition, the varying P t increases the uncertainty on the eavesdropper's channel, which can further enhance physical layer security. Secrecy performance analysis on this CIPC and the optimization of Q subject to a maximum transmit power constraint are challenging problems, since the communication from Alice to Eve is non-coherent with a random transmit power. We note that there is a limitation on this CIPC caused by the required channel reciprocity: this CIPC can only be used in time division duplex (TDD) systems since channel reciprocity normally does not exist in frequency division duplex (FDD) systems. In addition, the performance of this CIPC will be affected by the non-perfect channel reciprocity in TDD systems and therefore channel reciprocity calibration should be adopted to counteract this lack of full reciprocity.
locAtIon-bAsed beAmformIng wIth And wIthout ArtIfIcIAl noIse
Multi-antenna techniques (e.g., beamforming) are desirable for enhancing reliability and security in wireless communications. Such techniques require accurate CSI to achieve the expected performance gain. However, in URLLC it is hard or infeasible to obtain accurate CSI due to the ultra-low latency requirement, since determining a complex channel matrix costs a large number of channel uses (especially when the antenna number is large). Against this background, we find that location-based beamforming can serve as an alternative solution to improve reliability and security in some URLLC scenarios, where line-of-sight Challenging problems and potential solutions on CSI issues for physical layer security in URLLC. Here "Limited CSI" refers to imperfect CSI.
(LOS) components exist in the channel [15] . Such location-based beamforming, however, cannot achieve the same level of performance gain as traditional CSI-based beamforming, but can meet the ultra-low latency requirement in URLLC since it only requires the relative location information of the transceivers rather than a complex channel matrix. The accuracy of the location information and the weight of the LOS component determine whether (and how much) the use of artificial noise enhances the secrecy performance of the location-based beamforming.
conclusIons Due to its low complexity, physical layer security is able to provide security without violating ultra-low latency requirements, and potentially serves as the main technique to enable security in URLLC. In this article, we identified the security gap and rate interval as two useful performance metrics for evaluating physical layer security in the context of URLLC. We also provided wide guidelines on analyzing and enhancing physical layer security for URLLC. Furthermore, we clarified critical issues related to the use of CSI in achieving physical layer security in URLLC and presented potential techniques to overcome these issues.
